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The usurpation of legal roles by Suriname’s Governing Council,
1669–1816
Karwan Fatah-Black *
Suriname was one of the most emblematic slave societies of the Atlantic world
and saw a court system in which a Governing Council functioned
simultaneously as political council to the governor, as a criminal court and
also elected the Civil Court. Studies of the practice of the Governing
Council have been limited to a small number of spectacularly brutal cases
canonised by abolitionist campaigners. This article reconstructs how various
forums for arbitration related to the Governing Council, and how this
relationship changed by comparing its practices across the long eighteenth
century. I conclude that the Governing Council interacted with several
forums, both formally recognised as well as informal, in the colony. Over
time, adjudication became increasingly dependent on the authority of the
Governing Council. The combination of the political and legal roles
contributed to the process of colonial state formation in Suriname. Studies
of the practices of similar courts will clarify how the Dutch Empire
successfully governed its diverse populations.
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1. Introduction
The legal institutions that were introduced by colonists importantly shaped social
relations in the formative years of colonial societies. In their relation to pre-exist-
ing, competing and coexisting legal practices, the legal systems in colonies were
uniquely dynamic, balancing pluralistic practices while aspiring to singularity.
Although the European colonies of the Atlantic world (ca. 1500–ca. 1800) – exist-
ing in parallel to indigenous legal systems – could be expected to be relatively free
to shape a singular system, there too plurality remained structural.
Suriname was one of the most emblematic slave societies of the Atlantic world
and saw a court system in which a Governing Council (Raad van Politie en Crim-
inele Justitie) functioned simultaneously as political council to the governor, as a
criminal court and also elected the Civil Court. Members of the Governing
Council were nominated from the Protestant plantocracy, which made the court
central to maintaining social control based on race, religion and legal status.
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Studies of the practice of this court have been limited to a small number of spec-
tacularly brutal cases canonised by abolitionist campaigners. This article recon-
structs how various forums for arbitration related to the Governing Council, and
how this relationship changed by comparing its practices across the long eight-
eenth century. A broader examination of the court cases corrects the understanding
of the role of this court as merely an instrument in the hands of the plantocracy. I
conclude that the Governing Council interacted with several formally recognised
as well as informal forums in the colony. Over time, all adjudication became
increasingly dependent on the authority of the Governing Council, contributing
to the process of colonial state formation. Studies of the practices of similar
courts will clarify how the Dutch Empire successfully governed its diverse
populations.
From its founding in 1651 by English settlers to the abolition of slavery under
Dutch rule in 1863, Suriname was a borderland between the Atlantic Ocean and
the South American interior. Its settlement by Europeans and Africans in areas
of resilient indigenous civilisation resulted in a society of entangled and interact-
ing communities.1 In this colonial context a plurality of the legal systems mediated
between the legitimising colonial authority on the one hand, while allowing for the
perpetuation of conflicts on the other.2 This situation was far from static. Over
time, the Governing Council in Suriname was able to usurp practically all other
forums for adjudication of both civil and criminal cases. The one exception was
the indigenous population, who from the onset remained outside the purview of
the Governing Council. They ‘remained recognised as their own masters’, as gov-
ernor Jan Nepveu stated in 1765.3 This was in part the result of an attempt by gov-
ernor Cornelis van Aerssen van Sommelsdijck in 1686 to adjudicate what he
perceived to be the murder by an indigenous king of one of the king’s wives.
The governor had the king beheaded, prolonging the conflict between the colonists
and the indigenous population until peace was reached later the same year in 1686.
The treaty, which has been lost to posterity, established the autonomy of the indi-
genous population and their right to settle anywhere in the colony. The prescrip-
tion to the colonists was to not interfere in indigenous affairs and for government
representatives to diffuse conflicts to the best of their abilities.4
In all other areas the Governing Council had the authority to pass by-laws and
develop its own practices. The autonomy of the Governing Council in the colony
made law a semi-autonomous field that was not determined by metropolitan
1Rudie van Lier, Frontier Society: A Social Analysis of the History of Surinam (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1971).
2Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires,
1400–1900 (Cambridge University Press, 2010).
3Jean Nepveu, ‘Annotaties bij: Beschrijvinge van de volk-plantinge Zuriname’ (unpub-
lished manuscript, 1765).
4Eric Jagdew, Vrede te midden van oorlog in Suriname: Inheemsen, Europeanen, Marrons
en vredesverdragen 1667–1863 (Anton de Kom Universiteit, 2014) 468; Nepveu (n 3).
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authority. This resulted in law-as-process in which the court’s role was designed to
actively participate in adapting the legal system to changing local contexts. The
social and economic limitations on participation in the Governing Council set
limits on the interests that were served by its rule. This was also expressed by
who were allowed to vote for the nomination of members of the council. Jews
were excluded from the court, but were allowed to vote. Non-landholding mer-
chants were not enfranchised, although this changed with the rise of plantation
administrators who managed plantations on behalf of absentee landowners. The
eighteenth century also saw the introduction of the distinction between freed
and freeborn people of colour, excluding the former from participation in the elec-
toral process.
In this part of the Dutch Empire colonial hegemony rested not only on brute
force, but on dynamic adaptation by local courts to shifting social forces and
their associated normative orders. Given that in the colonial context metropolitan
power was at odds with the development of local power, locally shifting class-alli-
ances were part of the development of the colonial state.5 In Suriname, the Gov-
erning Council’s political decisions and legal verdicts formed a constitutive
element in shaping these alliances.
The legal practice of the Governing Council shows that the council was able to
increasingly move the colony away from a pluralistic legal system to a more singu-
lar one. What has remained unstudied for Suriname (and the early modern Dutch
Empire generally) is which forums were available to its diverse populations, how
these forums related to Dutch authority and how the Governing Council was able
to adapt over time and increase its authority. Given that the Dutch practices of
social control through judicial institutions proved to be resilient and succeeded
in maintaining empire across four centuries, makes this an all the more pertinent
question.
2. The jurisdiction of the Governing Council
Although not fundamentally different from other slave-based settlements in the
American tropics, the complexity of the Dutch colonial context warrants expla-
nation. First, it should be noted that the Dutch Atlantic in the eighteenth
century was home to diverse religious communities. There were various flavours
of Protestantism (Reformed, Lutheran, Moravian), Catholics and Jews (divided
between Sephardim and Ashkenazim) as well as communities with West
African roots.6 All of these had particular systems for dispute resolution within
5Karwan Fatah-Black, White Lies and Black Markets: Evading Metropolitan Authority in
Colonial Suriname, 1650–1800 (Brill, 2015).
6On the Protestants in Suriname see Johannes WC Ort, Surinaams verhaal: vestiging van de
Hervormde Kerk in Suriname (1667–1800) (Walburg Pers, 2000). The Jewish community
and the working of theMahamad are discussed in Robert Cohen, Jews in Another Environ-
ment, Surinam in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century (Brill, 1991); Wieke Vink,
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their communities, and several of these systems were officially recognised by the
colonising authorities. Secondly, since the majority of people in the Dutch Atlantic
were non-Dutch migrants (from the governors down to the plantation slaves), we
are confronted with a variety of traditions for disciplinary action and arbitration
that made their way from Europe, West Africa and the Americas to the colonies,
not to mention the copying of practices between colonies or the institutional
arrangements inherited from before the Dutch conquest.7 Lastly, the Dutch Atlan-
tic was politically fragmented. Different institutional arrangements existed in the
various colonies, adapted to a wide range of local specificities and a variety of
legal statuses.8
When the Dutch West India Company (Geoctroyeerde West-Indische Compag-
nie, WIC) established its first landed dominions overseas, it had to regulate how
government, which meant political authority, taxation, ecclesiastical matters and
civil and criminal justice, was organised. The practice had been to carry naval
and military practices from Holland and Zeeland to land, but with the presence
of people who were not the property or personnel of the company, provisions
had to be made for settlers and inhabitants, including indigenous as well as
former Portuguese and Spanish subjects in the conquered lands. In the 1629
‘Order of Government’ the practice of the Asian colonies was mimicked. In
cases of marriage and inheritance law the Political Ordinance of Holland of
1580 was, in effect, supplemented with the local customary laws of Zeeland
and Holland. Where this did not suffice, Roman laws were used as subsidiary
laws. Contracts were governed through Roman laws and for real estate there
‘Creole Jews. Negotiating Community in Colonial Suriname’ (PhD thesis, Erasmus Univer-
siteit Rotterdam 2008). For the African legacy see Natalie Zemon Davis, ‘Judges, Masters,
Diviners: Slaves’ Experience of Criminal Justice in Colonial Suriname’ (2011) 29 Law and
History Review 925.
7Jan Lucassen, ‘The Netherlands, the Dutch, and Long Distance Migration, in the Late Six-
teenth to Early Nineteenth Centuries’ in Nicholas Canny (ed), Europeans on the Move.
Studies on European Migration 1500–1800 (Clarendon Press, 1994); Gijs Kruijtzer, ‘Euro-
pean Migration in the Dutch Sphere’ in Gert Oostindie (ed), Dutch Colonialism, Migration
and Cultural Heritage (KITLV Press, 2008); Gert Oostindie and Jessica Vance Roitman,
‘Repositioning the Dutch in the Atlantic, 1680–1800’ (2012) 36 Itinerario 129; Karwan
Fatah-Black, ‘A Swiss Village in the Dutch Tropics: The Limitations of Empire-Centred
Approaches to the Early Modern Atlantic World’ (2013) 128 BMGN – Low Countries His-
torical Review 31.
8Anthonie JM Kunst, Recht, commercie en kolonialisme in West-Indië vanaf de zestiende tot
in de negentiende eeuw (Walburg Pers, 1981); Jacob A Schiltkamp, ‘Legislation, Govern-
ment, Jurisprudence, and Law in the Dutch West Indian Colonies: The Order of Govern-
ment of 1629’ (2003) 5 Pro Memorie. Bijdragen tot de rechtsgeschiedenis der
Nederlanden 320. With the founding of the Suriname Company the Hoge Raad was expli-
citly mentioned as the highest instance for appeal for colonists: Conditien, tussen de dry
respective leden van de Societeyt van Suriname, geconvenieert in dato 21 May, 1683 (Erf-
genamen Paulus Matthysz, 1683).
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were local feudal regulations in place. The indigenous population was allowed to
continue to adhere to their own laws without interference by the colonists.9
According to the Order of Government, authority should be vested with a local
body known as the High Government, resembling the later Governing Council in
Suriname. Some differences between the regulation of 1629 and the Governing
Council in Suriname should be emphasised. While the colonists had no voice in
the composition of the High Government – the various chambers of the WIC
were allowed to elect their representatives – the Governing Council in Suriname
was composed of colonists. The question of appeal is unclear under the Order
of 1629, but it seems there was, as in Asia, no appeal beyond the High Govern-
ment other than that the legal and governmental decisions taken by it had to be
approved by the Heeren XIX (directors of the WIC) in the Netherlands.
In Suriname the legacy of the preceding English period in the colony (1651–
1667) forced the conquering Zeelanders to make some important adaptations to
the format of the Order. Most importantly, the metropolitan authorities in the
English period – which had been marked by the chaotic conflicts between King
and Parliament – had been forced to give colonists a vote in the composition of
the council and even had developed a practice of colonists electing their governor.
This was the legacy that governor Julius Lichtenberg, a student from the Leiden
law school was confronted with when he founded the Governing Council in
1669. In order not to alienate the remaining colonists from the English period
the Zeelanders continued some of the earlier practices and allowed for two Eng-
lishmen to be included in the Governing Council. These local adaptations to the
Order of Government were given firmer footing in 1682 when the States of
Zeeland transferred the colony to the WIC, who were on this occasion granted a
charter for Suriname by the States General. This charter made old-Zeeland and
old-Holland laws effective in Suriname in relation to persons and inheritance,
and Roman law in relation to movable goods and slaves. Regarding real estate
there was a continuation of the aforementioned feudal laws.10 With the founding
of the Suriname Company in 1683 the Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-
Friesland was made the highest court of appeal for the colony.11 This indicates
that the aim of developing an administratively and legally centralised Atlantic
empire with its own overseas administrative centre (like Batavia in Asia) had
been completely abandoned.
The charter of 1682 had formalised a degree of autonomy allowing the Gov-
erning Council to issue its local by-laws in cases that were not covered by laws of
the higher authorities. These local by-laws mainly pertained to local questions of a
9AJA Quintus Bosz, ‘De weg tot de invoering van de nieuwe wetgeving in 1869 en de over-
gang van het oude naar het nieuwe burgerlijk recht’ in Een eeuw Surinaamse codificatie.
Gedenkboek 1869–1969 (Surinaamse Juristen Vereniging, 1969).
10Ibid, 7.
11Conditien, tussen de dry respective leden van de Societeyt van Suriname, geconvenieert in
dato 21 May, 1683 (n 8).
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specifically Surinamese nature as well as dealing with social dynamics of race and
slavery that were alien to the contexts of Holland and Zeeland. This system
remained almost completely unaltered until 1816. Furthermore, the English con-
quest of 1799 did not introduce any drastic changes in the local legal practices.
Between 1799 and 1816 there was no significant development in the legal
system.12 The continuation of slavery until 1863 delayed the adaptation of the
civil code until 1869.
The Governing Council, with its dual function as political council and criminal
court, carried by far the most weight in dealing with criminal cases and political
decisions in Suriname. The Governing Council appointed the members of the
Civil Court for four-year terms, as well as the members of the krijgsraad (Military
Court) for cases pertaining to military personnel. Meetings of these three courts
were all chaired by the governor, who was appointed by the Board of the Suriname
Company (Sociëteit van Suriname) in the Netherlands and affirmed by the States
General. The Suriname Company, sometimes also translated as Society of Suri-
name, resembled the chartered colonial companies that were common to north-
western Europe in the early modern period. The company consisted of three
shares: one held by the WIC; one by the city of Amsterdam; and one, until
1770, by the family Van Aerssen Van Sommelsdijck. The Board of the Suriname
Company in Amsterdam mediated conflicts and approved decisions by the Gov-
erning Council. Conflicts were brought to the attention of the board through
direct requests or through the Governing Council. The States General mediated
in conflicts that the Board of the Suriname Company felt unable to handle. The
States General also served as the Appeal Court for the West Indies, for which
they in turn employed the Hoge Raad van Holland, Zeeland en West-Friesland
as councillors.
The governor chaired the Governing Council and was also the highest-ranking
official in military affairs.13 The members of this Council were male Dutch
Reformed planters nominated by the male heads of landowning households
(including Jews) in the colony. Given the fact that the Governing Council con-
sisted of slave owners by definition, the colony has been characterised as a
plantocracy in which planter interests were dominant.14 As a result, the legal
system has been understood as strongly biased in favour of slave owners and
strongly biased against slaves and non-whites. The term plantocracy, however,
should not be taken to suggest a monolithic power block of plantation owners.
An overemphasis on social control misses the fact that the Governing Council
changed its role over time and increasingly became a point of reference and
12Quintus Bosz (n 9) 8.
13Jan Jacob Hartsinck, Beschryving van Guiana, of de Wildekust in Zuid-America (Gerrit
Tielenburg, 1770) vol 2, 872–73.
14Ruud Beeldsnijder, ‘Om werk van jullie te hebben’ Plantageslaven in Suriname, 1730–
1750 (Vakgroep Culturele Antropologie, 1994) vol 16, chapter 12.
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authority for communities who were not free Protestant landowners. Given the
propensity of the governor to side with the planters, it seems justified to say
that, despite their differences on matters of taxation, defence costs and regional
trade, the appointed governor and the plantation elite did not disagree on what
people they thought were most fit to rule the colony in matters of policy and crim-
inal justice.
3. The autonomy of religious communities
The Dutch Reformed Protestants and Jews (both Portuguese and German) formed
the largest religious communities among the free landowning people in the colony.
Ecclesiastical bodies in Suriname, primarily a Mahamad for each of the Jewish
communities and the Kerkenraad, were very active in dealing with disputes
among their co-religionists and enforcing discipline within the community. The
Jewish Mahamads, one Portuguese and one German, were uniquely positioned
in dealing with both religious as well as civil cases. Records of these institutions
are available, although the literature on the Kerkenraad is extremely limited.15 The
Sephardic Jewish community in Suriname has been studied in greater detail, using
among other sources the records of the court to trace the intercommunal relation-
ships between Amsterdam, Curaçao and Suriname, as well as the forging and pro-
tection of Jewish identity in the colony.16 The German Jewish community was
formally separated from the Portuguese Jews in 1724. The separation had
grown out of the unhappiness of German Jews with the dominance of the Sephar-
dic Jews. After the separation of the communities conflicts between them contin-
ued. While the role of the Governing Council in the Kerkenraad had been
important from the beginning, it took until the late 1780s before the Mahamad
was brought more definitively into the fold. The Mahamad kept the Governing
Council at arm’s length and often emphasised and fostered its relationship with
the governor and the company directors in the Netherlands.
The highest authority in the Dutch Reformed Church in Suriname was the
Conventus Deputatorum, also known as Generale Kerkenraad or Classis Surina-
mensis.17 A member of the Governing Council was always present at its meetings,
which took place twice a year. The overlap between religious and worldly auth-
orities in the membership of the Kerkenraad might explain the relative paucity
15Ort (n 6); Jan Marinus van der Linde, Surinaamse suikerheren en hun kerk: plantageko-
lonie en handelskerk ten tijde van Johannes Basseliers, predikant en planter in Suriname,
1667–1689 (H Veenman, 1966).
16Cohen (n 6); Vink (n 6); Jessica V Roitman and Aviva Ben-Ur, ‘Adultery Here and There:
Crossing Sexual Boundaries in the Dutch Jewish Atlantic’ in Gert Oostindie and Jessica V
Roitman (eds), Dutch Atlantic Connections, 1680–1800 (Brill, 2014) http://
booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/b9789004271319s010 (accessed 29
March 2016).
17Ort (n 6) 237.
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of cases with which it dealt. The Kerkenraad mostly dealt with practical matters
concerning the organisation of the church and the provision of instructions for tea-
chers active in the colony, as well as questions of morality regarding intimate
relations and marriage. In 1698, the Kerkenraad requested that the Governing
Council deport to Holland a widow who was behaving badly. Two years later it
requested that an entire family ‘that leads a vexatious life’ be relocated, and dis-
cussed matters concerning the discipline of the congregation.18 Because of their
close connection to the state, the ecclesiastical authorities were not free to do as
they pleased, although their direct access to members of the Governing Council
made them powerful figures.
Their authority lessened somewhat once other varieties of Protestantism were
allowed to practice their faith in the colony. After 1740, the Lutheran Church was
officially recognised in Suriname. The first Lutheran minister Ds Phaff interest-
ingly became embroiled in a dispute with the Reformed Church that was taken
all the way to the States of Holland. Phaff needed a Reformed minister for his
own wedding ceremony, but complaints against the marriage had been filed at
the Reformed Kerkenraad. Phaff filed an appeal with the Governing Council
but simultaneously persuaded the Lutheran Church council to send a request to
the States of Holland. Although the States of Holland stated they could not
revise the decision about Phaff’s intended marriage, escalation of the case to the
higher level did move the Governing Council to allow the wedding to take place.19
The differences between the Protestant Kerkenraad and the Jewish Mahamad
are clear. The autonomous jurisdiction of the Jews extended beyond religious
matters as the Mahamad was allowed to hold trials in minor civil cases up to
10,000 pounds of sugar.20 This right had been established under English rule in
1665, a few years before the Dutch conquered Suriname. A sample of cases
held by the Mahamad in 1775 makes clear that it primarily dealt with debts
within the community. In that year, it dealt with about 40 cases, involving sums
between fl 10 and fl 562, sometimes individual debts, sometimes claims against
estates of deceased members of the congregation.21
In religious matters, the Mahamad could request the Governing Council
banish members of the congregation from the colony. To request excommunica-
tion or herem, the Mahamad had to convene the Adjuntos (universal council) of
the community.22 Issues of banishment and excommunication brought to the
fore the question of the patrocinio (patronage) of the Amsterdam community of
Jews over the diaspora. Should communities in London, Hamburg and Bordeaux,
as well as across the Atlantic in Suriname and Curacao, revert to Amsterdam in
18Ibid, 244: ‘dat een ergerlijk leven leidt’.
19Ibid, 148.
20Rudolp AJ van Lier, ‘The Jewish Community in Surinam: A Historical Survey’ in Robert
Cohen (ed), The Jewish Nation in Surinam (S Emmering, 1982) 20.
21NL-HaNA, Portugees-Israëlitische Gemeente Suriname, 1.05.11.18, inv nr 300.
22Cohen (n 6) 150–51.
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cases of appeal?23 An informative case on the relationship between the jurisdic-
tions of these various courts is the trial of Salomon Montel, inhabitant of Suriname
and a member of the Portuguese Jewish Nation. The Mahamad wanted to banish
Montel and found the governor on their side. It argued that Montel had committed
usury, which is forbidden under Mosaic law. Rather than going to the rabbinical
court in Amsterdam, Montel took his case to the ‘Appeal Court of the West
Indies’ (this was for all intents and purposes the Hoge Raad van Holland,
Zeeland en West-Friesland on behalf of the States General) and won his case
there.24 Although the case itself was rather straightforward, the intervention of
the Appeal Court reveals a tension between the Mahamad, the governor and the
Governing Council. Based on a request made by Montel to the States General,
the Governing Council in Paramaribo was ordered to supply the States General
with documents of the trial held in the Mahamad of the Portuguese Jewish com-
munity in Suriname. The Governing Council in turn requisitioned the narratio facti
from the Mahamad. The States General formulated their original request on 11
March 1763. Almost a year later, on 16 February 1764, the governor and
council met again and discussed a letter drafted by two councillors (Steenberg
and Dandiran) to answer the request from the States General. The governor
wanted to take over the writing of the letter from the commissioned councillors,
but the councillors prevented this since the request of the States General had
been made to ‘Governor and Councillors’. The letter was approved. The military
commander, a member of the council, then intervened, arguing that the States
General could not have intended to alter the system of government by the letter
address. Obviously, the tiptoeing around sensitive issues in consequence of such
a simple request points to a more complex power relation than a simple order
for the local governing council to requisition the paperwork of an ecclesiastical
court would imply. With some delay, the regents of the Jewish Nation, in the
wording used by the Governing Council, honoured the request by the council of
3 June 1763 to supply them the narratio facti of the Montel trial. In this paper-
pushing we get a sense of the power play that was involved in mediating the
relationship between the Mahamad, the governor and the Governing Council.
The intervention by the States General was quite disruptive but had, for Montel,
the desired effect.25
For its authority, the Mahamad relied on the help of the governor, stating: ‘it
will please the Governor to protect the College and lend a strong hand, so that the
same may be respected and obeyed’.26 The dependence of the community on
23Evelyne Oliel-Grausz, ‘Patrocinio and Authority: Assessing the Metropolitan Role of the
Portuguese Nation of Amsterdam in the Eighteenth Century’ in Yosef Kaplan (ed), The
Dutch Intersection (Brill, 2008) http://booksandjournals.brillonline.com/content/books/
10.1163/ej.9789004149960.i-450.39 (accessed 29 March 2016).
24Vink (n 6) 76; Cohen (n 6) 128–44.
25NL-HaNA, Staten Generaal, 1.01.02 inv no 9515.
26Cohen (n 6) 151.
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Dutch authority also stretched into defining its Ascamoth (body of laws). To
change these laws, which were akin to a local constitution, the Mahamad had to
convene the Adjuntos, and its decision had to be approved by the directors of
the Suriname Company.27 Over time, the Jewish community lost much of its
autonomy. By 1787, it could no longer pronounce excommunication over Jews
who lived in violation of its civil laws or the Ascamoth. They were to be taken
to Fort Zeelandia to be incarcerated instead, merging the practices of the
Mahamad with those of the Governing Council.28
4. The Maroon communities
Not all communities were formally recognised by the Governing Council. The
kuutu (literally a meeting, also spelled krutu) of the Maroon communities is an
example of an uneasy but increasingly entangled informal relationship between
the Maroons and the Governing Council. The kuutu was a meeting of Maroons
living outside the borders of the colony, but connected to the colonial sphere, in
which they practiced self-rule. The Maroons were the descendants of slaves
who had escaped the plantations and had managed to settle in enduring commu-
nities subdivided into lo (clan or sub-tribe) and consisting of multiple be (literally
belly, meaning matrilineal family). In these communities, the kuutu dealt with
issues arising among the Maroons at the level of the lo, including criminal and
witchcraft trials. In case of problems within the community or conflicts between
different lo a neutral village elder or lanti would preside over a trial.29
Witch trials were the most frequent trials and they could even take place post-
humously. Witchcraft or wisi was regarded as the result of jealousy, which drove
people to summon dark forces to hurt the object of their spite. Members of the
Maroon community often understood misfortune to be the result of witchcraft
by jealous people within the community. Witch trials were performed after a com-
plaint had been made to the kuutu. If the accused party was found guilty the trial
could have various outcomes, predominantly either banishment or capital punish-
ment. In posthumous trials their goal was to establish if a person had been a witch
during their life. Posthumous trials were held by having two entranced bearers
carry the deceased’s body on a bier while a spirit was asked questions by a
priest. The bearers would function as medium between the spirit and the kuutu
and would provide an answer to the priest’s questions by walking in a certain
direction. Bearers had an economic interest in findings of guilt since they could
keep some of the accused’s possessions. As a result, the competence of the
27Ibid, 152.
28Ibid, 153.
29Wilhelmina van Wetering and HUE Thoden van Velzen, Een zwarte vrijstaat in Suriname
(Deel 2): de Okaanse samenleving in de negentiende en twintigste Eeuw (Brill, 2013) 228–
29.
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bearers was mistrusted to a degree. If the kuutu suspected foul play the bearers
could be replaced mid-trial.30
The kuutu initially functioned beyond the reach of the colonial authorities, and
the Governing Council in particular. This changed after the first peace treaty
between the colonial state and the Okanisi (also known as Aucaners or Ndyuka
Maroons) in 1760. From that year onwards the peace treaties made between the
Maroons and the colonial state brought these groups increasingly into the
purview of the colonial authority. Initially, with the Okanisi Peace of 1760, the
colonial government tried to push for a clause in the treaty stating that capital pun-
ishment could not be meted out by the Maroons themselves, but could only be
delivered by the colonial state. The Maroons refused to accept this loss of auton-
omy and the clause was removed from the treaty. In a second peace treaty, that of
1762 with the Saamaka (Saramacan Maroons), the treaty obliged this group to
handle criminal cases in the Maroon-controlled areas and included the privilege
of meting out capital punishment. Even so, the colonial state did make two excep-
tions in Article XI of the treaty of 1762. Both parties agreed that white colonists
who came into conflict with the Maroons or committed a crime would be tried in
Paramaribo before the Governing Council, and the colonial state retained the pre-
rogative to prosecute any Maroons who may have been involved.31
The treaty does not make clear if this particular clause only applied when
Maroons were suspected of committing a crime outside the Maroon-controlled
areas. Cases are known regarding Maroons in Paramaribo who refused to be
tried before the Governing Council and insisted that their trial be held in their
own settlement. On 4 June 1762, a group of four Maroons got into a brawl with
public prosecutor Rocheteau and were detained. Because the four claimed that
the Governing Council could not adjudicate the case, colonial officials contacted
the gaanman (leader, sometimes spelled granman) Pamoe in the interior. At his
request, the four were extradited.32
The longer the peace lasted, the greater the control of the Governing Council
became. When two years later, on 7 December 1764, a Maroon man attempted to
break open a door in a fence connecting two plots of land in Paramaribo, the men
on the other side of the fence warned him to stop or they would take him to the
governor. To this the Maroon answered ‘abon, mie granman soo bon leeke joe
granman’ (‘good, my granman is as great as your governor’). Despite these
30Ibid, 137–40.
31Hartsinck (n 13) 807: ‘gelyk zy ook gehouden zullen zyn te straffen alle de zodaanige
onder hen, die eenig kwaad of molest komen te pleegen zelfs tot Doodstraffen toe’.
Which translated to ‘they will be held to punish, those among them who come to
commit any evil or damage, this even includes capital punishment’.
32Jean Jacques Vrij, ‘Bosheren en konkelaars: Aukaners in Paramaribo 1760–1780’ in Peter
Meel and Hans Ramsoedh (eds), Ik ben een haan met een kroon op mijn hoofd: pacificatie en
verzet in koloniaal en postkoloniaal Suriname: opstellen voorWimHoogbergen (Bert Bakker,
2007) 26.
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proud words, in this specific case and in similar ones afterwards, the Governing
Council did prosecute and punish the Maroon, although the punishment was rela-
tively light and was administered by other free Maroons.33 By letting other free
Maroons execute the sentence, the Governing Council chose to combine the exer-
cise (and extension) of their authority in the adjudication of Maroon cases with the
incorporation and therewith implication of Maroons in the judicial process. This
had the further advantage of avoiding the Maroons’ humiliation of being punished
by an official executioner in the service of the colonial state, who would most
likely have been a slave.
In the years after the first treaties, other Maroon groups were also brought into
the colonial fold. The Maroons sent representatives to the city of Paramaribo and
the colonial authority stationed posthouders with the Maroons. The purview of the
colonial authority increased over time. After peace had been concluded with the
Okanisi (1760) and Saamaca (1762) the colonists were confronted by a new
round of sustained attacks by the Boni Maroons, also known as the Aluku. In a
draft for a peace agreement with the Boni Maroons, Article VI demanded ‘a
final and unqualified submission to our judiciary, law courts and fiscals’.34 With
the renewal of the peace with the Okanisi in 1809 the article on justice was
amended. The colonial government pledged to extradite Maroons who fled
justice in their own villages. The Okanisi were held to extradite Maroons who
had abused slaves or free people on the plantations or in Paramaribo, and the Gov-
erning Council would punish them accordingly, as they would those Maroons who
committed crimes within the jurisdiction of the Governing Council.35
In the early nineteenth century several conflicts rose about the execution of
witches by the Maroons, and the Maroons’ right to autonomous capital punish-
ment of witches was contested by the colonial government.36 Over time, the auth-
ority of the kuutu eroded. In 1972, the anthropologists Thoden van Velzen and Van
Wetering heard a Maroon conclude a trial by saying that he would like to have had
the guilty party whipped, but that the Bakaa (whites) had forbidden this. Instead,
the defendant was ordered to cook a wan gaanyanyan (great meal) and remain in
the shade for the remainder of the kuutu while other cases were brought before the
oracle.37
5. Slave justice
Among the enslaved on the plantations similar African traditions were adapted to
the circumstances of American slavery as among the Maroons. Their freedom to
organise dispute resolution was of course far less than that of the Maroons.
33Ibid, 26–27, 299.
34Jagdew (n 4) 488.
35Ibid, 493.
36Van Wetering and Thoden van Velzen (n 29) 118, 159, 337.
37Ibid, 229.
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Formally, slaves had the option to refer their conflicts to the slavemaster on the plan-
tation or to the Governing Council. Yet informal modes of dispute resolution also
existed. On the plantations in Suriname the language Sranantongo (literally ‘Suri-
name tongue’) was developed as a creole out of African and European languages.
To this day the word for court is krutu and the word for trials is krututori (literally
‘court story’).Krutu can refer to a court ruling, but is also used for chatting, criticis-
ing, complaining, or quarrelling. Although the actual institution of a meeting in
which verdicts were reached and judgments were passed was not present on the
plantation, or only in hidden form, the word for the practice of adjudicating cases
is virtually the same as with the Maroons. In Sranantongo the judges are to this
day referred to as krutubakra (literally ‘court white man’), krutubasi (‘court
boss’) or krutuman (‘court man’) and the courthouse is a krutu-oso (‘court
house’). This overlap in meaning between the words for the Maroon practice of
dispute resolution and the much more restricted practices among the enslaved is
striking.
The role of the lukuman (‘seer’) in the plantation trials is likely to have been
similar to that of the Maroon priest or oracle. Because of the more hierarchical
social relations on the plantations, the basja (‘overseer’, often a slave) is also
seen in central roles in settling differences. Some written sources survive that
testify to their role in conflict resolution amongst the enslaved.38 Among the
slaves there was a practice of organising ordeals, modelled on West African prac-
tices, to establish the truth of accusations. Since this topic has been discussed more
extensively in a recent article, I restrict myself here to the relationship between
plantation trials among the slaves and the Governing Council.39 In this respect
the accusation of witchcraft was a very grave one, and in combination with poison-
ing it was severely punished if it came to the attention of the Governing Council.
Cases of poisoning among slaves, a proxy for witchcraft, reached the written
records of the colonial court in several instances.40 It appears that plantation
slaves would refer an accusation of poisoning to the plantation owner, who
would in turn refer such cases to the Governing Council, and that slaves would
also try to reach the Governing Council directly. Cases of poisoning were often
punished capitally, a fact that slaves were aware of, making the accusation of poi-
soning between slaves an option for capital punishment by proxy. As will be illus-
trated by the case discussed below, the Governing Council did take the existence
of informal courts on the plantations into account.
This can be seen in the trial of Quacoe, decided by the Governing Council on
21 February 1775.41 The case centres on the poisoning of the slave Quamina, from
plantation Beekvliet under the management of director D.H. Dörfeld. A group of
38Davis (n 6).
39Ibid.
40NL-HaNA, Hof van Justitie, 1.05.10.02, inv nr 801 and 756.
41NL-HaNA, Hof van Justitie, 1.05.10.02 inv nr 827, folio 72 t/m 73; 76 t/m 77.
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slaves accused a slave named Quacoe of poisoning Quamina. The accusing slaves,
Beijman, Tamboer, Prins and Present, testified that Quacoe was a poisoner and had
been involved in another violent assault as well. The plantation director Dörfeld,
however, suspected that Quacoe was not guilty but feared that Quacoe would be
killed by the other slaves if he was not executed first by order of the Governing
Council. The Governing Council found that Quacoe was innocent and moved to
condemn Prins and Present to receive the Spanish buck (punishment by
lashing) at the fortress Zeelandia. They also sided with Dörfeld in his fears for
Quacoe’s fate. In the verdict, the plantation administrators (Dörfeld’s superiors)
are instructed not to let Quacoe back on the plantation Beekvliet to prevent
‘further accidents’, a euphemism for Quacoe being killed by the other slaves.
6. Plantation managers and the Governing Council
Slave owners, managers and overseers on a plantation were formally governed by
local by-laws in exercising their rights as proprietors of slaves. Ruud Beeldsnijder
found that it was virtually impossible for slaves to bring cases of abuse to the crim-
inal court and that the complaining slaves were often punished harshly.42 The pos-
ition of the governors on this issue, based on their lamentations in letters to the
colonial directors in the metropolis, was often that they were appalled by the
brutal behaviour of the plantation managers, but unable to successfully change
it. This situation, however, was not static. Before 1750 the legal methods by
which the local government could curb the domestic jurisdiction of plantation
owners or managers were the regulations regarding the white overseers and the
plantation regulations. From 1750 onwards the plantation regulations included
limits on the form and severity of punishments.43
The overseers on the plantations were often former soldiers or sailors, and as
such they were accustomed to coercive labour relations in which the captain or
officer had the right to adjudicate crimes, including insubordination and labour
related conflicts. In the absence of a Dutch equivalent of the slave codes, the pre-
rogative of the plantation managers was regulated by locally issued by-laws and
Roman law regarding slaves. Slave owners and plantation managers had the
right to domestic correction and as a result the trials on the plantation only
surface sporadically in written sources. The plantaadjeregelement (‘plantation
regulations’) regulated the jurisdiction of the plantation manager and that of the
Governing Council in Paramaribo. In a series of plantation regulations the Govern-
ing Council limited the severity of punishment that a manager could mete out, and
on occasion plantation managers faced prosecution for the ill-treatment of their
slaves. The first of the regulations was issued in 1684 and updated versions
were circulated in 1695, 1686, 1725, 1749, 1760, 1761, 1784, 1799 and 1817;
42Beeldsnijder (n 14) vol 16, chapter 12.
43Ibid.
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and closer to the abolition of slavery in 1863, two more regulations were issued,
one in 1851 and one in 1856.44 While the plantation regulations stated what kinds
of cases were to be tried before the court in Paramaribo, the divide between a case
that may be tried by the planter on the spot and one that must be referred to the
Governing Council is unclear. Avague notion such as ‘the atmosphere on the plan-
tation’ (as perceived by the manager) could be cause for referring a case to the city.
In these instances, the Governing Council offered a way to resolve a dispute away
from the physical context of the plantation, and in that way prevent escalation and
possibly generalised revolts of slaves against the manager and the overseers.
Alex van Stipriaan has argued that the ‘iron fist’ that ruled over the slaves had
become gloved in the nineteenth century, indicating that punishment became less
harsh, and that a wider range of options was deployed for plantation managers to
alleviate tension on the plantations.45 This description makes sense after 1815,
since from that year the colonists no longer had the right to nominate local
people for the Governing Council. However, the process of providing access to
the Governing Council to slaves had already been set in the mid-eighteenth
century. In the nineteenth century the purview of the colonial court in Paramaribo
clearly increased. In 1828, the colonial government decided that the Spanish buck
could no longer be meted out by plantation managers, but only by the government
in town. In 1842, the number of lashes that a plantation manager could order was
also reduced to a maximum of 25 for adult males, 15 for adult females who were
not pregnant and for adolescents between the age of 14 and 16 between 10 and 15
lashes.46
A clear example of the balance between domestic correction and trials before
the Governing Council is the case of Manuel, a creole man enslaved on the Cor-
tenduur in Suriname, along the Pirika Creek which was under the management of
Abraham van Deventer.47 The temporal and spatial implications of referring a case
from this isolated place to the court in the city are obvious.48 Given the small
44Aksel Quintus Bosz, ‘De ontwikkeling van de rechtspositie van de vroegere plantagesla-
ven in Suriname’ (1981) 35 Surinaams juristenblad: orgaan van de Surinaamse Juristen-
Vereniging 490; Meindert Rutgert Wijnholt, Strafrecht in Suriname (Rijksuniversiteit Gro-
ningen, 1965); Johannes A Schiltkamp and JTh de Smidt (eds), West Indisch Plakaatboek
(Emmering, 1973).
45Alex van Stipriaan, Surinaams contrast: roofbouw en overleven in een Caraïbische plan-
tagekolonie, 1750–1863 (KITLV Uitgeverij, 1993) 372.
46Ibid, 372–73.
47The case can be found in NL-HaNA, Raad van Politie 1.05.10.02 inv no 803. NL-HaNA,
Sociëteit van Suriname, Resoluties van de Raad van Politie, 1752, 1.05.03 inv no 144.
48Alexander de Lavaux, ‘Generale Caart van de Provintie Suriname : Rivieren & Districten
Met Alle D’Ondekkingen van Militaire Togten Mitsgaders de Groote Der Gemeetene Plan-
tagien Gecarteert Op de Naauwkeurigste Waarnemingen: Rechterhelft Boven’ (1737)
UBM: Kaartenzl: 107.08.59 (Kaart), Surinamica, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam,
http://resources21.kb.nl/gvn/SURI01/SURI01_Kaartenzl-107-08-59_X.jpg (accessed 4
October 2017).
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number of white colonists available, one would have needed a willing and trust-
worthy group of slaves to row those involved to the city. So, when Abraham
van Deventer on 4 July 1752 suspected that some of his slaves had been drinking,
he knew that he had the highest authority to serve as prosecutor, judge and maybe
even executioner if he were to pursue this issue. He asked Manuel if ‘he knew
slaves on the plantation who had been drinking’.49 Van Deventer had withheld
the distribution of dram (a crude rum) for some time, which was a common
form of collective punishment used by plantation managers.50 Van Deventer
called the basja to mete out lashes to Manuel, probably for his impertinence
and drunkenness. The basja, however, informed Van Deventer that the dram-
stijlder (rum distiller) Joela had given the dram to Manuel. Joela in turn pointed
a finger to Christiaan Vrijburg, the blankofficier (‘white overseer’), as the one
who had been distributing the dram. As a result, Joela was given lashes for
having sold the dram to Christiaan Vrijburg. Vrijburg was not punished for his
supposed transgression. None of this was cause for any alarm, as it was all part
and parcel of the daily workings of a plantation. Van Deventer had to weigh the
evidence and decide how to handle things further. Deciding who was guilty of
what and how this should be punished was done on the spot without much cer-
emony.51 However, these were only the opening moves in a conflict that would
end with the execution of Manuel in Paramaribo. While these events unfolded,
Manuel had left the gathering before he could be questioned further. Two days
later Manuel fled the plantation with three timmernegers (‘enslaved carpenters’).
The escapees were later caught on a nearby plantation, after which a more soph-
isticated ‘trial’ began at Cortenduur. The recaptured escapees were interrogated by
Van Deventer while the scribe Jean Nicolas Gertoua took minutes of the investi-
gation. Manuel once again managed to escape, only to be recaptured two days
later, on Saturday 8 July 1752, after which Van Deventer brought him before
the criminal court in Paramaribo on 11 July, on charges of mutiny and escape.
Manuel was found guilty and executed.52
In this particular case Van Deventer used three legal forums to deal with
Manuel, whom he did not own himself, but over whom he clearly exercised a
right of control. First he initiated an investigation and imposed punishment in
front of the plantation house. When the challenge to his authority increased, he
held a plantation trial indoors assisted by his clerk. Once the situation began to
slip from his control he referred the case to the Governing Council in Paramaribo.
We can only guess what Van Deventer’s intentions may have been, although some
possibilities are obvious. The immediate, rather chaotic gathering that started
when Van Deventer asked Manuel about slave drinking was impromptu, although
49NL-HaNA, Raad van Politie 1.05.10.02 inv no 803.
50Van Stipriaan (n 45) 371.
51NL-HaNA, SvS, 1.05.03 inv no 803.
52Ibid.
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it followed an established pattern of ad hoc questioning and immediate punish-
ment by the basja and the white overseer. The escape of Manuel and his co-con-
spirators was handled more formally. The accused were detained, questioned and a
scribe took their statements. The escape was a direct challenge to the working of
the plantation and even more threatening since it happened at the outer reaches of
the plantation area, in a period when Maroon attacks were becoming more fre-
quent.53 By formalising the trial and holding it behind closed doors, Van Deventer
may have hoped to diffuse the situation. Manuel’s case was treated individually
and in the end the trial against him was moved off the plantation site to the city,
several days of travel away. As events unfolded, the informal power of Manuel
became painfully clear when he managed to draw three skilled slaves into a plot
to escape. He also displayed an understanding of the power relations between
the local manager and the actual owner of the plantation. It was clear that
Manuel was becoming a threat to Van Deventer’s authority, and after the second
escape to Rietveld Van Deventer had an argument to get rid of Manuel once and
for all.54 Van Deventer likely understood that the charge of escape was a grave
one in the context of increasing marronage, and the members of the Governing
Council dealt with the matter swiftly.
The situation as it was in 1750, at the time of the case of Manuel, was about to
change. Comparing the criminal cases held before the Governing Council in 1750
to those held in 1775, it is possible to see a change in the legal status of both the
suspects and the victims. In 1750 the picture is clear. White suspects were accused
of inflicting harm on 12 white victims in total and on 1 mixed group of freed and
enslaved victims. Slaves were accused of crimes against 15 white victims and 3
enslaved victims in total. A manumittee was accused of harming a group of
whites and slaves. We find no free white suspect accused of a crime against a
slave in 1750. In 1775, however, we find 14 slaves as victims of free white
people.55
Over the course of the eighteenth century, the jurisdiction of the Governing
Council expanded at the expense of the slave owners. Slave owners became
restricted in the kinds of offences they could deal with, as well as the punishments
they could administer. There was a clear rise in the number of cases initiated by
slaves to challenge the brutality of the slave owners. The outcomes of these
cases, however, greatly favoured slave owners, rarely resulting in the punishment
of the accused. Out of five cases in which slaves accused their master or plantation
director of mistreatment, three ended in punishment for the accusing slaves. An
example is the complaint in 1775 of a diverse group of slaves from theD’Eendragt
plantation. The slaves are listed in the record with either their craft or their status,
53Frank Dragtenstein, ‘De ondraaglijke stoutheid der wegloopers’: marronage en koloniaal
beleid in Suriname, 1667–1768 (Utrecht Inst voor Culturele Antropologie, 2002) 146–86.
54NL-HaNA, SvS, 1.05.03 inv no 803.
55NL-HaNA, toegang 1.05.10.02, inv nr 800, 801, 827 and 828.
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suggesting that these were craftsmen and field slaves operating together. They had
complained about the plantation manager before, but now brought their grievances
before the Governing Council and requested that the ‘plantation government was
examined’.56 The Governing Council investigated the case by examining the
white overseer and clerk on the plantation. However, it concluded that the ‘com-
plaints by the slaves had been made on frivolous pretexts’ and decided to
‘condemn the complaining negroes to the Spanish buck at the fortress’.57
Although incidents were indeed investigated, the result usually favoured the
plantation managers. When the meting out of a Spanish buck to a female slave
Dia resulted in her death two days later, the plantation director was sentenced to
pay a fine of fl 300.58 More severe punishment for white violence followed
when lower-ranking whites mistreated, wounded, or killed slaves. After acciden-
tally firing a lethal shot at a slave on the plantation Vissershoop, the free white
plantation director Jan Michiel Thiel was sentenced to be tied to a pole, flogged
and banished from the colony.59 In a fencing game the free white man Pierrot
van Phannekoek accidentally wounded an enslaved man named Alert. Alert was
owned by the Suriname Company and, although he was the victim in this case,
he was condemned to receive the Spanish buck at fortress Zeelandia.60
During the quick expansion of the plantation system, between 1750 and 1775,
it is already visible that the Governing Council was not taking a simple one-dimen-
sional stance with regards to white violence against slaves. Although the outcome
of the legal process remained heavily in favour of the white elite, the possibility to
arraign masters and the occasional punishment of (lower-class) whites for violence
against slaves points to an adaptation by the Governing Council to the growing
numerical superiority of, as well as increasing resistance by, the enslaved.
7. Conclusion
This article has investigated the changing role of the Governing Council in Suri-
name during its existence from 1669 to 1816. Historians of Suriname have often
cited clashes between local elites, represented by the councillors, and metropolitan
56NL-HaNA, Raad van Politie Suriname, 1.05.10.02, inv nr 827 folio 293–309. The slaves
were listed as Soliman, Kees dresneger (medic), Sambo metselaar (mason), Maart timmer-
man (carpenter), Joris crioolen (creole), Saturdag and Pieter soutwater (slaves born in
Africa).
57NL-HaNA, Raad van Politie Suriname, 1.05.10.02, inv nr 827 folio 293–309: ‘dat de
klagte van gemelde slaaven op frivoole pretexten sijn voorgebragt hebben goed gevonden
de gemelde klaegende negers te condemneere, soo als deselve gecondemneert worden bij
deesen, om met een spaanse Bock op het fortresse te worden afgestraft en aan de adminis-
trateur de Bije te worden gerestitueerd mits betaalende de kosten ten dese gevalle.’
58NL-HaNA, Raad van Politie Suriname, 1.05.10.02, inv nr 828, folio 446 t/m 449 and 452
t/m 453.
59NL-HaNA, Raad van Politie Suriname, 1.05.10.02, inv nr 828, folio 29–43.
60NL-HaNA, Raad van Politie Suriname, 1.05.10.02, inv nr 828, folio 256.
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interests, represented by the governor, as the main dynamic in the Governing
Council. The broad variety of legal statuses, ranging from Protestant landholder,
landowners of other religions, enslaved people, those who had been manumitted,
freeborn persons of colour, free Maroons and indigenous people, were all treated
differently by the Governing Council. Multiple forums for arbitration – mostly
based on religious affiliation – existed in the colony. By studying how these
forums related to the Governing Council, it becomes clear that their relationship
with the Governing Council changed over time. In all cases the Governing
Council, which combined legal and political authority, was able to increase its
authority. The ecclesiastical bodies, especially the Jewish Mahamad, expressed
communal autonomy vis-à-vis the Governing Council and the governor. Among
the Maroons, who were beyond the formal boundaries of the colony, the Govern-
ing Council was able to increment its authority after the first peace negotiations
were concluded – although their autonomy seems to have remained respected
far into the nineteenth century. With the growth of the plantation sector and the
increasing imbalance between the number of free people and slaves, the Govern-
ing Council began to offer limited judicial access to slaves. Although slaves did
not stand a fair chance to win a case, the Governing Council conducted extensive
research into the complaints lodged by slaves, giving the impression of a serious
trial both to the accusing slaves and to the modern-day researcher. Overall, the
Governing Council was better able to adapt to changing communitarian concerns
in the colony than the literature has acknowledged.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Imran Canfijn, Mark Ponte and Mandy Hakker for their assist-
ance in research as well as Prof.mr. Koops, the anonymous reviewers and the Atlantic his-
torians at Leiden University for comments on earlier versions of this text.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
The research for this article was funded by the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research
(NWO) [grant number 016.164.025].
ORCID
Karwan Fatah-Black http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2788-6270
Comparative Legal History 261
